The Russia-Ukraine war has entered a phase in which the most important question may no longer be whether Moscow can achieve a decisive victory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It is whether Russia can keep fighting long enough to make Ukraine, its allies and the wider West lose the political will to continue<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That is the central argument behind the idea of Vladimir Putin’s so-called \u201cPlan D\u201d<\/strong>\u2014a strategy built less around a dramatic battlefield breakthrough and more around endurance, pressure and waiting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Firstpost<\/em> analysis argues that Moscow may have moved beyond earlier ambitions of achieving a quick military victory and is instead pursuing a longer game: maintaining pressure until circumstances become more favourable to Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That does not necessarily mean Russia has abandoned the goal of gaining territory or influence over Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It means the Kremlin may increasingly believe that time itself can become a weapon<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many expected the conflict to be decided relatively quickly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That did not happen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine resisted the initial assault, Western countries provided military and financial support, and Russia was forced into a much longer and more expensive war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Years later, neither side has achieved everything it wants.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia controls significant Ukrainian territory but has not conquered the country or forced Kyiv to surrender.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine has prevented Russia from achieving its broader objectives but has also struggled to restore all of its internationally recognised territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The result is a brutal war of attrition<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And attrition changes the strategic calculation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Instead of asking, \u201cCan Russia defeat Ukraine quickly?\u201d, Moscow can ask a different question:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Can Russia outlast Ukraine?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The most important feature of this alleged Plan D is patience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia does not necessarily need to produce a spectacular breakthrough every month.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It can continue applying military pressure while waiting for political, economic or diplomatic conditions to change.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That could include:<\/p>\n\n\n\n This approach turns the conflict into a contest of endurance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine must keep mobilising resources to defend itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia must keep absorbing the enormous costs of war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And both sides are betting that the other will eventually reach its limit first.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is where the \u201cRussia can’t win, won’t stop\u201d argument becomes particularly interesting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A traditional military victory would mean achieving clearly defined objectives through overwhelming force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But Moscow could potentially claim success through a much narrower outcome.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If Russia can retain territory it currently occupies, prevent Ukraine from joining Western security structures, weaken Ukraine’s economy and force Kyiv into negotiations on terms more favourable to Moscow, the Kremlin could present that as a strategic victory\u2014even without conquering Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That is a very different definition of winning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And it makes the war much harder to end.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For Kyiv, the challenge is therefore bigger than stopping Russian advances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine also needs to preserve the political commitment of its international partners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Western support has been critical to Ukraine’s ability to resist Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But maintaining that support indefinitely is difficult.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Governments change.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Public priorities shift.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Budgets come under pressure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Other global crises compete for attention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia can exploit those uncertainties simply by continuing the war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That is why a strategy based on endurance could be attractive to Moscow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia does not necessarily need the West to support Ukraine forever. It may only need to wait for support to become less consistent.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n A prolonged war is also an economic contest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia has adapted its economy to wartime production, redirected trade and continued earning significant revenues from energy exports despite Western sanctions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That does not mean sanctions have had no impact.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They have imposed costs on Russia, restricted access to some technologies and forced Moscow to restructure important parts of its economy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But Russia has demonstrated that it can continue financing military operations despite those restrictions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine faces a different problem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Its economy has been severely damaged by the war, while its government depends heavily on external financial assistance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That creates an uncomfortable asymmetry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia is fighting to maintain its war effort.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine is fighting to survive while depending on others to sustain part of its war effort.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The future of the conflict increasingly depends on Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n European countries have expanded military assistance to Ukraine and have become more important as questions arise about the long-term role of the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That creates both an opportunity and a vulnerability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If European governments remain united, Russia faces a much more difficult path toward outlasting Western support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If disagreements emerge over military spending, sanctions or the scale of assistance to Kyiv, Moscow could see an opening.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Kremlin therefore has an incentive to wait and watch\u2014not necessarily because it expects Ukraine to collapse tomorrow, but because political unity can change faster than military front lines<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is perhaps the most important new perspective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The war is often described as a competition between missiles, drones, artillery and troops.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But there is another battlefield: time<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia has a larger population and greater industrial capacity than Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine has stronger Western partnerships and significant military advantages in areas such as intelligence, technology and modern weapons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Neither side has an unlimited advantage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That makes endurance crucial.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Putin’s calculation may be that Russia can absorb the costs of war longer than Ukraine can absorb the costs of permanent mobilisation\u2014and longer than Western governments can sustain their political commitment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If that calculation is correct, Moscow does not need to win spectacularly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It simply needs to avoid losing while waiting for the strategic environment to change<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There is an important counterargument.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A war of endurance is not automatically a winning strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia is also paying a heavy price.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Its military has suffered substantial casualties, its economy has become increasingly dependent on defence spending, and its relationship with Europe has been fundamentally damaged.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A prolonged war also creates uncertainty for the Kremlin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine continues developing drones and long-range strike capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Western countries continue adapting their military support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia’s ability to recruit and equip troops could face increasing pressure over time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And the longer the war continues, the greater the possibility of an unexpected event changing the strategic picture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So Plan D, if that is indeed what Moscow is pursuing, is not a guaranteed route to victory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is a bet on endurance<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There is another paradox.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia may want negotiations, but Moscow also has little reason to accept an agreement that does not protect its core objectives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine, meanwhile, has little reason to accept a settlement that permanently rewards territorial conquest or leaves it vulnerable to another Russian attack.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That creates a narrow diplomatic corridor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Both sides can say they want peace while disagreeing fundamentally over what peace should look like.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The longer that disagreement lasts, the easier it becomes for military calculations to dominate diplomatic ones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The phrase \u201cRussia can’t win, won’t stop\u201d captures an important contradiction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia may not be able to achieve the maximalist objectives associated with the beginning of the invasion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But that does not mean the Kremlin has to give up.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Instead, it can pursue a more limited strategy designed to improve its negotiating position over time<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Every additional month of fighting can potentially create another opportunity:<\/p>\n\n\n\n A change in Washington.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A divided Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A Ukrainian manpower shortage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A battlefield breakthrough.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A financial crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A diplomatic opening.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Moscow does not have to know which one will happen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It only has to believe that waiting gives it a better chance than accepting an unfavourable settlement today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For the war to move decisively toward an end, something would probably have to alter that calculation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine could become sufficiently strong on the battlefield to make continued Russian advances too costly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Western support could become more durable and predictable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia could face economic or military constraints that make prolonged warfare increasingly difficult.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Or both sides could conclude that the costs of continuing exceed the benefits of holding out for a better outcome.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Until then, negotiations may remain possible without becoming decisive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Russia-Ukraine war has already demonstrated that military superiority alone does not guarantee a quick victory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia failed to achieve a rapid conquest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine failed to quickly expel Russian forces from occupied territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The conflict has instead evolved into a contest involving military power, industrial capacity, economics, diplomacy and political endurance<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That is why the concept of Plan D matters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It suggests that Moscow’s strategy may no longer depend on winning the war outright.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It may depend on convincing everyone else that continuing to fight is more difficult than accepting a compromise<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For Ukraine, the challenge is to prove that it can endure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For Europe and its other allies, it is to demonstrate that support will not disappear simply because the war has become long and exhausting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And for Putin, the gamble is whether Russia can wait longer than its opponents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The battlefield may determine who gains ground. But in a war built around endurance, the side that controls the clock can ultimately have the strongest hand at the negotiating table.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The Russia-Ukraine war has entered a phase in which the most important question may no longer be whether Moscow can achieve a decisive victory. It is whether Russia can keep fighting long enough to make Ukraine, its allies and the wider West lose the political will to continue. That is the central argument behind the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-26","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"yoast_head":"\nFrom Quick Victory to a War of Attrition<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The Strategy of Waiting<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n
Why Russia May Not Need a Decisive Victory<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Ukraine’s Problem Is Not Just the Battlefield<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The Economic Dimension<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Europe Has Become Central to the Equation<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Putin’s Biggest Weapon May Be Time<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
But Waiting Is Also Dangerous for Russia<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The Diplomatic Trap<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The New Perspective: Russia May Be Fighting for Leverage, Not Victory<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
What Could Finally Change the Calculation?<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The War’s Most Important Battle May Be Over Willpower<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n